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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) have been disrupting
industries through shifting novel services, and business
models. Organizations should also redesign their
business service models to navigate this disruption. A
holistic understanding of digital transformation through
IoT requires the cooperation of multiple disciplines
ranging from engineering to economics. This paper
utilizes a conceptual model to develop an analytical
framework to investigate a number of pricing strategies
enabled by different business models. Our findings
demonstrate that the Internet of Things phenomenon has
the potential to disrupt the way we do business by
connecting markets and enabling new business models.

1. Introduction
In the world of ever-changing business models,
organizations require utilize technologies to profoundly
enhance their performances and to gain sustainable
competitive advantage. Internet of Things (IoT) is one
of the drivers of this digital transformation in this
competitive age. Businesses are expected to meet new
targets, seek new opportunities and avoid new threats as
they face competition against connected services
enabled through IoT. Digital technologies have changed
the business models on many levels. First, these
technologies created synergies among markets that were
previously detached. They allowed collaboration
through advanced and richer ways of communication.
Technologies have also opened new horizons for new
data collection, storage, processing, along with many
other ways to disrupt conventional way of conducting
business.
Digital transformation is the implementation of
digital technology applications that accelerate the
business activities and competencies to leverage the
opportunities. Searching, finding, and processing
information became easier and cheaper because of
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digital transformation. It enhances effective and faster
communication. Organizations that utilize IoT services
can collect business data from sensors, and also
automatically take actions without human intervention
before service is impacted. [1] Organizations can use
this collected information to achieve competitive
advantages by improving business process and offering
better services. [2]
Digital transformation includes digitalizing the
business operation, adopting technologies and thus
changing the business environment. Embracing
technologies and digitalization enable organizations
advancing towards digital transformation. In the
growing business internet-based technologies, IT
operations limit the required expertise in order to sustain
a competitive advantage. The need arises for
synchronizing new operational technologies with
existing administration focused information technology
system. Converging Operation Technology and
Information
Technology
ameliorate
business
performances, maximizes business efficiency and
process management tools to have accurate information
at a given time in its best form. The rapid and massive
growth of mobile devices and traffic gives a good
example of combining these two technologies in digital
transformation. This growth allows people and thing to
communicate faster at any given time and also, enable
enterprises and government agencies to monitor and
control digital devices remotely in real time. The
integration of these two technologies create
opportunities for businesses and provide greater
economic benefit. Though there are some key
challenges underlie this integration. Another challenge
for manufacturers are for remote locations, limited
resources, multiple technologies, mobility require
remodeling the procedures.
In this paper, we explore the driving forces and key
challenges in embracing the IoT phenomenon. We
develop a prospectus for new business models and use
analytical modeling framework to initiate this
transformation.
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1.1 Technological components of IoT
Specialized computing tools of IoT make the
principal layer of complexity. The first layer is the
"Things". These are the autos, refrigerators, and other
smart devices. To put it plainly, they are the ordinary
tools that we use with no computing or information
processing capacities. With the coming of IoT, we are
transforming these non-smart tools into processing
mediums.
The second component is the Internet and
corresponding hardware, software and service
providers. Hardware providers produce the switches,
routers, modems and other networking software
required to provide internet services. Cisco, Juniper, etc.
are examples of hardware providers. Software providers
provide some of the software like switching software,
speed optimization algorithms, etc., that are used to
provide optimum bandwidth and speed. Finally, there
are service providers such as Comcast, Frontier, Century
link, etc., who provide internet access to both
commercial establishments and homes.
The third component is hardware that is required to
enable the “Things” to use the Internet for
communications. This hardware can be a part of our
everyday objects that functions to collect data and
transmit it to the platform. Hardware can come in
various forms like integrated circuits, SIM cards,
sensors, etc. Companies like Honeywell, Akita
electronics, Samsung are examples of hardware
manufacturers.
The fourth component is the platform that provides
the required intelligence to analyze the data and provide
a decision. This is the heart of the IoT system and is
responsible for collecting the data from the ‘Things’,
store it in a database that is either local or on the cloud
and is responsible for the analysis of data and
corresponding decisions. Intelligent Systems from
Microsoft, Internet of Everything from Cisco, etc. are
examples of commercially available platforms. Of the
four IoT components, the platform is the most complex
and is the binding factor for all the other components. It
collects the data from the ‘Things’, uses logic and
intelligence to make a decision, and communicates it
back to the ‘Things’ using the hardware and Internet.
Taken together, Figure 1 displays the related
components of IoT. The complexity of the IoT system
creates more than a few market end-users. As such, it
presents numerous combinations of ownership that need
attention if an organization chooses to serve these users.
To better understand these possible combinations of

ownership we explore what constitutes a platform and
how the components interact with each other in the
following section.

The
Things

Internet

Internet
of
Things

Hardware

Platform

Figure 1. Technological components of IoT

1.2 Offerings/sides in the IoT market
Consumers are typically an important player in any
market. However, in the IoT market, the term
“consumer” is rather confusing. Consumers of IoT can
be end-users of a system or consumer of a particular
platform, device or service. For example, the end-user
of any connected “Thing” is obviously a consumer.
However, a car manufacturer (such as Ford) can also be
a consumer when it buys Sync service or other
intelligent solutions from Microsoft. To summarize, one
side of the market can be a consumer for another. In this
study, to avoid any confusion about consumer
identification and market offerings, we will use the word
“consumers” only for the end users.
Figure 2 represents the connected offerings of a
multi-sided market. The “Things” manufacturers are
those producers that offer durable goods. These are the
manufacturers of everyday objects such as cars,
refrigerators, or vending machines. Examples of
manufacturers are Toyota and Frigidaire. Typically,
these manufacturers expect a one-time payment for their
product. In a conventional market, strategies of durable
goods manufacturers are relatively simple. For example,
if the firm is a monopolist it can maximize its revenue
and it is bounded by Coase theorem [3] in the presence
of a strategic consumer. In competition, the firm can use
the Bertrand model [4] to set a price, or the Cournot
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model [5] to set a quantity and then solve for optimal
strategies. However, if a market has more than two
offerings or sides with network effects, as current
research suggested, conventional economic approaches
such as Coase theorem fails and market will not be
efficient [6, 7].
Telecom
platform
providers
offer
telecommunication networks in various different
technologies. For example, Verizon is a cellular
provider and an integral part of the IoT ecosystem since
the communication signals run on their platform. We
categorize any communication service provider under
the telecom platform category.
Security is one of the main concerns in the IoT
industry before customers adopt smart things at a larger
scale. This requirement is similar to any other internetenabled technological market. Telecom providers will
be the main player in the IoT industry to address security
and privacy concerns of customers. Moreover, telecom
platform providers position themselves uniquely
between the customer and any other service or good
seller to mitigate these concerns.
Even though today there is a debate whether
standardization can lead to a more secure IoT market,
prior trends indicate that different IoT technologies may
converge in the future into one standardized protocol.
Consumable goods or services are another integral
side of the IoT market. The main reason for a consumer
to buy a smart durable good is the fact that it offers
additional value in terms of consumable goods or
service. For example, a smart fridge can order groceries
without human intervention. Companies such as
Amazon.com are already offering this service type with
Amazon Fresh. However, there is a potential for any
brick and mortar store to offer the same product or
service to serve the IoT enabled grocery market.
IoT presents an opportunity for advertisers to
analyze consumers. There is a tremendous amount of
data coming from each smart thing owned by a
consumer. Sometimes that data can be large enough to
be termed as “Big Data” and novel algorithms,
computing power and logic are required. The
advertising service has to analyze the data coming from
all the data sources and communicate the appropriate
advertisement back to the device. For example, in the
future your fridge can recommend different brands of
milk in addition to ordering it. This provides an
opportunity for sponsored durable goods, which was
rarely available in the past for everyday consumers.

Durable
Goods
"Things"

Telecom
Platform

Internet
of
Things

Consumable
Goods or
Services

Advertising

Figure 2. Offerings in the IoT market

In this study, first we define the offerings of the IoT
market and explain its multi-sided nature. Subsequently,
we outline four different business ownership models and
their strategies. Each one of these four cases can be a
guideline for IoT researchers to develop analytical
models. For example, in e-commerce, researchers can
develop pricing models both in monopolistic and
competitive settings. In operations research, supply
chain and supply web models can benefit from our
conceptual framework. Our aim is to investigate the IoT
market structure and identify the market offerings.

1.3 Problems not yet addressed
We are motivated with the countless problems that
are not yet addressed adequately both in academia and
in the industry. For example, during our preliminary
open-ended interviews, we quickly discovered that
people’s ability to understand the changes and their
implications were limited. It is apparent that the change
the rate of human capability to absorb complexities. As
a result, most practitioners do not follow a scientific
strategy for their critical strategies, such as pricing of
IoT services.
IoT services are different from conventional
technologies mainly because of their high-level of
connectivity and the lack of human intervention. This
requires new approaches for an organization’s risk
profile. The sheer number of devices and their
variability creates a complexity that’s never seen before
in the past. Moreover, much of these devices connect to
the systems outside a single organization.
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For example, during our preliminary interviews, a
high-level executive at a Fortune 500 organization (that
considers itself an IoT leader) did not have a precise
strategy for services pricing. This example is only one
institutional component for sales and marketing. We
observed this trend repeatedly for system management,
analytics and even application development.

service providers that react to the data, such as a local
grocer that receives the information about a consumer’s
refrigerator contents and triggers a delivery order to
refill used items. Alternatively, an advertisement firm
may receive information that generates a customized set
of advertisements to be mailed to the refrigerator owner.

To clarify, we explore these research questions:
What are the institutional components of the IoT
market? Which business service models and strategies
are available for a firm targeting presence in the IoT
industry? In addition to the theory, we provide a
strategic model for practitioners to make decisions on
presence, pricing, and supply web design in each side of
the IoT industry: durable goods, consumable goods and
services, telecom platform, and advertising.

As this example demonstrates, the flow of
information across the platform effectively enhances the
product-service offering. However, the network effects
may be considered beyond the benefit to the consumer
that owns the object of interest. That is, the IoT has
essentially brought together different end-users that
subsist on the information shared across the Internet.
These types of network externalities have generated
much interest in the way business service models may
be created.

Literature Review

2.2 Computing technology and the IoT

2.1 Internet of things

Computer science and engineering research already
have a considerable number of studies that define core
IoT concepts and literature surveying the computing
realm relevant to IoT [2].

The term Internet of Things (IoT) first originated
from a presentation given by the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology researcher Kevin Ashton in 1999 at
Procter & Gamble [1]. Currently, IoT term represents
the “integration of the physical world with the virtual
work of the Internet” [8, p. 1]. That is, the IoT is the
network through which information resources may be
shared between smart objects [9] and ultimately, to
market entities in order to enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness with which services are provided to
consumers.
To demonstrate the way information resources may
flow across a particular framework to provide enhanced
service, we describe a grocery service example. First,
there is an object of interest, a refrigerator, with
machine-to-machine communication capabilities. The
object of interest has certain attributes, in this case,
information about the groceries inside the refrigerator
that are readable by another machine. Second, there is a
device that interacts with the object of interest to capture
and package information. In the case of the refrigerator,
a monitoring device such as a sensor may detect the
current contents of the refrigerator. Third, external
devices are those machines that receive information
from the monitoring device through the internet and
translate the information into actionable data for
managed services. The managed services can exist in a
number of other markets.
For example, a discovery service provider may serve
as a data intermediary that connects data about the
object to end-users [10]. The end-users may include

In our search, we noticed that security issues stand
out as the primary concern for the IoT technology [2, 8,
10]. As we identified four offerings in the IoT market,
telecommunication platform providers appeared in a
unique position, between the customer and any other
firm offering IoT goods and services; therefore, they
have the potential to address many of these security
concerns. On the other hand, intentionally creating a less
secure environment can enable fast growth similar to the
case of the Internet [2].
Research direction for the IoT has a wide horizon
ranging from massive scaling with knowledge creation
and big data analysis informing the interactions with
humans [6]. Deployment of energy efficient
technologies may also continue to inspire green IoT
research which investigates optimal energy usage.
Although computer science and engineering research is
extremely useful for technical progress, it does not
address the practical need for a business service model
to monetize the market. In other words, without
improving knowledge about viable business service
models we will continue to find new disappearing firms
of the IoT industry that suffer the same fate as AltaVista
and Netscape.
Firms in the IoT-enabled industry need innovative
business service models to survive and flourish.
Although we found one conference paper investigating
business model innovation [7], it was limited to the
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service design processes in postal logistics. Therefore,
we feel confident to claim that we are filling the gap of
business service models and market presence strategies
in the IoT industry.

2.3 Multi-sided markets
To understand the full complement of network
externalities calls for a new perspective of the business
service model. Past research has used the foundation of
two-sided markets [13] to study a number of model
designs and strategies with two markets (see progress
report by [7]). A two-sided market can be defined as
“one in which 1) two sets of agents interact through an
intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each
set of agents effects the outcomes of the other set of
agents, typically through an externality” [13]. For
example, video game platforms connect players and
game developers, and platforms that draw more players
will attract more game developers and vice-versa.
Researchers have expanded on simple two-sided
markets to consider freemium models whereby one
market receives a discount or free product to understand
the tradeoffs of offering the discount or free information
product to one side of the market versus the other [6].
Economides and Katsamakas [14] specifically looks at
optimal pricing strategies of two-sided markets
consisting of proprietary platforms versus open source
platforms. However, researchers suggest that the twosided market may be too simple to represent real world
company strategies [15]; rather, the networked
relationships that connect multiple end-users should be
considered. Building on the network effects of
relationships between two user groups, we consider the
way users interact with each other across multiple sides
of the market.
To understand business service models that
incorporate the impact of information in a market with
more than two sides, we consider at multi-sided market.
In Table 1 we provide examples of multi-sided markets,
specifically four-sided markets that extend previously
conceptualized two-sided markets [16].

3. Model
In order to represent competition in IoT-enabled
multi-sided markets, we expand a classic two period
Hotelling model [17] to j market sides with asymmetric
market shares. We use this model to investigate how
prices and market shares would change over time and to
explain strategies for market envelopment though
externalities.

3.1 The Role of Hotelling’s model
In this paper, we utilize the Hotelling’s competition
model for a baseline to represent an asymmetric rivalry
among to firms. We would like to underline that we only
use the Hotelling’s model as an established method to
represent the competition. We develop over this basic
model through the representation of multiple sides in the
IoT market.
Please note that Hotelling’s model is an essential
part of our formulation but it is merely used as a baseline
to represent the competitive nature between IoT service
providers. The focus, and the main contribution of our
model is beyond Hotelling’s competition, which
concentrates to characterize the multiple sides in the IoT
services industry. As we outlined in section 1.2,
numerous offerings in the IoT industry creates multiple
sides in this complex market ranging from telecom
platforms to the advertising market. In this study, we
aim to develop the first stylized analytical model to
represent the multi-sided nature of this digital
transformation.
As aforementioned in the abstract, our aim is to
demonstrate that the IoT phenomenon leads to a digital
transformation via disrupting the way firms do business
by connecting markets. This connection creates multisided markets and new business models emerge to
create value in these connected-ecosystems. Leaders
such as Amazon and Apple has the potential the benefit
from these new business models, particularly via new
pricing models and strategies to grab market share.
Perhaps more significantly, these new business
models has the potential to disrupt markets, along with
creating new jobs or making others obsolete. Starting
with the Hotelling’s competition model, we aim to
demonstrate that conventional pricing schemes will be
inferior to the multi-sided pricing strategies. More
importantly, firms that understand and employ multisided strategies will benefit from early capture of market
share in multiple sides of the IoT-connected markets.
IoT is a relatively new field and there are many gaps
in research, especially in modeling IoT services and
strategies. Ehret and Wirtz [18] recommend that vast
business value can be mined from IoT services through
scientific analytical models. In addition, Oberländer et
al. [19] suggest that virtually infinite connections among
devices and people could result in a new paradigm and
complexity that could only be examined through
analytical tools and methods.
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3.2 Operationalization of the IoT ecosystem
The notation used in this paper is in Table 1.

The IoT-enabled market are served by two firms (𝑎
and 𝑏) with asymmetric initial market shares:
0 ≤ 𝑞45 < 0.5 < 𝑞49 ≤ 1
The asymmetric market share assumption benefits
the model in two ways. First, it provides a more realistic
representation of current IoT-enabled markets. Second,
it covers a wider range of theoretical scenarios than an
equal-market-share case.
We also assume that, in the market setting above,
there is a continuum of customers uniformly distributed
between firms a and b. This horizontal differentiation
(which indicates that IoT-enabled service characteristics
across a market side are fixed) is due to inherent
characteristics of IoT services (such as customer taste,
ease of operation, configurability, compatibility and
security perception) rather than the physical location.
In our model setup, there are i firms in j sides of the
market. Multi-sided markets develop over time,
generally with the introduction of a disruptive
technology because network externalities require time
to affect a market. [15] For example, it took
Amazon.com years to develop a viable electronic book
reader platform and benefit from synergies on both sides
(e-reader and e-book) of the publication market.
Therefore, most multi-sided markets start with
independent organizations serving each side. The best
representation of a pre-competition multi-sided market
is the case where firms independently serve separate
sides of the market.
We consider a two-period pricing game with two
firms. Price 𝑝-. represents the price of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡.
Customers make purchase decisions based on their
utilities. The term x . is the distance of the customer

0

𝑞0𝑎

𝑞0𝑏

𝑎
0

1
𝑏

𝑞0𝑎

𝑞0𝑏

𝑎

1

Side j

Definition
Customers’ utility
Firm index: i ∈ {a, b}
Period: t ∈ {0,1,2}
Cost of switching: 𝑐# ~ U[0, θ]
Network effect on u
Market side index: j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Marginal shifting cost
Price of firm i in period t
Quantity sold by firm i in period t
Distance from buying the service from firm i

Side 1

Table 1. Notation
Term
u
i
t
𝑐#
e
j
α
𝑝-.
𝑞-.
𝑥.

buying the service from firm 𝑖. In addition, the term
c? represents any costs incurred to switch. The initial
picture looks as shown in figure 3:

𝑏

Figure 3. Illustration of the initial condition for the model

For simplicity, we denote 𝑒AA as e, and omit the
.
.
subscript 𝑗 in 𝑝Cand 𝑞C. The net utility of the
indifferent customer for firm a in the second period can
be characterized as:
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 9 − 𝑝G9 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 9 ) − 𝑝G5 − 𝑐#9 + 𝑒𝑞A5
The indifferent customer determines new market
shares for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period.
We use backward induction to find equilibrium
prices and quantities sold to represent market shares.
First, we start with the second period solution, and then
we solve the maximization problem for the first period
profits to find equilibrium prices and quantities sold. As
mentioned in table 1, 𝑞-. denotes quantity sold by firm 𝑖
in period 𝑡.
The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent customer in the
second period is:
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 5 ) − 𝑝G5 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 5 − 𝑝G9 − 𝑐#5 + 𝑒𝑞A5
We can determine the new allocation of market share
for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period by
determining the quantity of switching customers. To
find market shares for the second term, we start by
identifying customers who switch:
Customers will switch from firm 𝑎 to firm 𝑏 when
𝑐#9 < α(2x N − 1) + pNG − pPG + 𝑒(𝑞A5 − 𝑞A9 ). Similarly,
firm 𝑏 customers switch to firm 𝑎 when 𝑐#5 <
𝛼(1 − 2𝑥 5 ) − 𝑝G9 + 𝑝G5 + 𝑒(𝑞A5 − 𝑞A9 ). Please note that
switching cost can be different for each customer since
it is a distribution. Such switching costs bring additional
trade-offs over the heterogeneity of tastes. For example,
consider two customers where one is closer to firm 𝑎 in
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tastes. Normally we would expect the closer customer
to stay with firm 𝑎 and the farther customer to switch,
however, if the closer customer’s switching cost is low,
and the farther customers switching cost is high, then the
farther customer can stay with the firm because of high
switching costs and the closer customer may switch to
the rival’s service.
We assume that 𝛼 < 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 to avoid the negative
probability of switching and an interior location 𝑥 for
the customer. This assumption not only improves
tractability in the general model, but also it is a better
representation of reality. Price 𝑝 in our model includes
inherent penalties of switching, therefore a customer’s
switching cost will be less than the price difference, or
else the customer would not switch. These conditions
are checked for all possible cases (negative and positive)
of optimal solutions.
RS
Let 𝑛-C
be the quantity of customers who bought
from 𝑙 in period 𝑡 − 1, and firm k in period 𝑡, in market
side j. For example, customers who switched to firm 𝑏
59
from firm 𝑎 in period 2 are represented as 𝑛GC
.
Therefore, customers staying with firm 𝑎 can be found
through the following calculation:

99
𝑛GC

bc_

X

=UV

U

4

Y(GZ[A)\]^_ []^` \a(bc` [bc_ )

1
𝑑𝑠f 𝑑𝑥
𝜃

=

(𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 (𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞A5 𝑒 + 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 )
𝜃

Market share for firm 𝑎 at the end of period 2:
𝑞G9 = 𝑛G99 + 𝑛G95
= 𝑞A9 +

𝑝G5 − 𝑝G9 + 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 )
𝜃

Market share for firm 𝑏 at the end of period 2:
𝑞G5 = 𝑛G55 + 𝑛G59
= 1 − 𝑞A9 +

𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 − 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 )
𝜃

Firm 𝑖 maximizes its second period profit.
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋G. = 𝑝G. 𝑞G.
]

First order conditions give us equilibrium prices as:
𝑝G9∗ =

(1 + 𝑞A9 )𝜃 + 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 )
3

𝑝G5∗ =

(2 − 𝑞A9 )𝜃 − 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 )
3

Equilibrium quantities sold are:
𝑞A9 (𝛼(1 − 𝑞A9 ) − 𝑝G9 + 𝑝G5 + 𝑒(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 ) + 𝜃)
=
𝜃

𝑞G9∗ =

(1 + 𝑞A9 ) 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 )
+
3
3𝜃

𝑞G5∗ =

(2 − 𝑞A9 ) 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 )
+
3
3𝜃

Customers switching from firm 𝑎 to 𝑏:
59
𝑛GC

=

=

𝑞A9

99
− 𝑛GC

𝑞A9 (𝛼(𝑞A9 − 1) + 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 − 𝑒(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 ))
𝜃

As a result of the second period profit maximization,
we obtain profits as a function of quantities sold in the
first period:

Customers staying with firm 𝑏:
A
55
𝑛GC

=

X

= UV

U

bc_

Y(A[GZ)[]^_ \]^` \a(bc` [bc_ )

1
𝑑𝑠f 𝑑𝑥
𝜃

(𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 (𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞A5 𝑒 + 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 + 𝜃)
𝜃

Customers switching from firm 𝑏 to firm 𝑎:

πN∗
G =

(𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 ) + (1 + qNA )θ)G
9θ

πP∗
G =

(𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5 ) − (2 − qNA )θ)G
9θ

For the first period maximization problem, we
follow a process similar to the second period. First, we
identify the indifferent customers to find switching costs
𝑐# in terms of 𝑥 . and prices.

𝑛G95 = 1 − 𝑞A9 − 𝑛G55
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The net utility of the indifferent customer for firm 𝑎
in the first period is:
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 9 − 𝑝A9 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 9 ) − 𝑝A5 − 𝑐# + 𝑒𝑞A5
The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent customer is:
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 5 ) − 𝑝A5 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 5 − 𝑝A9 − 𝑐# + 𝑒𝑞A5
Subsequently, we solve the maximization problem
for the first period profits to find equilibrium prices and
quantities sold. Tracing previous steps shows that there
are optimal pricing strategies for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 in the
basic model.
Theorem: There exists a solution for the maximum
revenue in IoT-enabled markets, thus there are rational
pricing strategies for firms 𝑎 and 𝑏.
Proposition 1: Cross-market externalities increase
the benefits to the market leader in terms of quantities
sold.
Proposition 2: The market leader can charge a
higher price in the presence of positive cross-market
externalities without losing market share.
Please note that these results only hold for the
market share leader firm, because the externality effects
across time periods conflict with the inter-market
externality effects for the follower firm.

3.3 Industry examples
We are already observing the assembly of multiple
market sides through various IoT service offerings and
devices. A few days ago (in September 2018,) Amazon
announced that it will start selling multiple IoT-enabled
devices including a connected smart microwave oven
that is voice controlled, learning and responding with its
proprietary personal assistant Alexa. This device is
more than a simple internet-connected plaything for
geeks. It has the potential to connect the grocery,
durable goods, and the advertising industries (if not
more.) In the near future, we speculate that Amazon will
offer more IoT-enabled durable goods for home and car.
For example, our refrigerators and coffee makers will
start to talk and collect data. Interestingly, the pricing of
these devices will be well below the cost, as we
predicted in our stylized model.
We are essential in the round 1 of this IoT-enabled
pricing and market share strategy game. It is not too late

for other firms to follow early movers such as Amazon.
However, if a competitor waits too long, it can
completely miss the window to benefit from IoTenabled markets. The impact of Internet of Things are
much more than technological sensors and voice
recognition. IoT-enabled services has the potential to
disrupt conventional industry such as groceries, that are
previously thought to be relatively safe from digital
transformation.

4. Conclusion
Our vision of the future IoT industry includes a firm
or a set of firms that appreciate the multi-tiered nature
of the market we presented in this study. At the extreme,
a firm can still benefit from other complementary
offerings while providing free goods and services to the
customer. For example, it would not surprise us to see a
smart refrigerator dominating every household because
it is sold considerably under its cost with the expectation
of groceries or other consumable goods and services
paying for the difference along the way. Likewise, both
this refrigerator and groceries can be subsidized via
household consumption data collected from the smart
device, similar to Google providing a free search service
based on advertising. In either case, customers enjoy
lowered costs while the strategic firm enjoys market
domination, and scalable revenues stemming from the
complementarities in this multi-sided market. On the
negative side, this business service model has the
potential to disrupt a number of industries including
durable goods, retail, and even telecommunication.
Each case in our service design models provides a
theoretical guideline for prospective research and
presents an opportunity for future studies in various
fields such as information goods pricing models, supply
chain design, and policy development for potentially
inefficient IoT markets. Beyond, IoT industry, our
concepts can be used for any information systems
enabled market complex enough to serve four different
sides.
In addition to the theory, practitioners in the IoT
industry are in dire need of strategic business ownership
models because conventional models do not fully
capture externalities and the multi-sided nature of this
market. Using our framework, practitioners can decide
if they want to offer products and services in each side
of the IoT market. Before they consider this decision,
they can compare aforementioned pros and cons of each
case. Early ownership decisions for each side of the IoT
market can mean market domination for a firm or being
the next failure in a disrupted industry.
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For example, a marketing manager at an IoT services
organization such as Amazon could utilize our model to
price their IoT-enabled services both in the basic case
and in the presence of time-inconsistent discounters. In
such a case, we expect to see highly-discounted durable
goods in the short run in order to dominate the market.
For example, Amazon could deliver IoT-enabled smart
refrigerators at cost or even at a loss which could be
subsidized by the groceries or by the other sides of this
complex market.
On the other hand, the competition is obviously is at
a disadvantage in this setting. This might force
competitors to form alliances in order to gain
competitive advantage and benefit from the economies
of scale. For example, we wouldn’t be surprised to see
IoT alliances between durable goods manufacturers
(such as Samsung) and retailers (such as Walmart) in the
near future.
This research has limitations due to the nature of the
conceptual model research methodology. First,
arguments and propositions in this study have not been
tested empirically or any other method. Furthermore,
conceptual models naturally adopt certain aspects in the
cultural literature. Therefore, the arguments in this paper
should be taken as mere propositions until they are
scientifically proven.
This work can be extended as we observe how the
IoT industry develops and create business service
models more specific to address the needs of the
customers, organizations and institutions.
Future research on IoT business service models are
not limited to pricing and supply chain models.
Petabytes of “Big Data” generated through advertising
side of the IoT market will create an opportunity of
novel empirical marketing research and even novel
theories.
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